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HAIGLER V. DONNELLY.

Oct. 1941.]

[18 C. (2d)

HAIGLER
[18

[6] Id.-Compensation_Rate and Amount-Commissions in Excess of Fixed Price-Effect of Consent to Sale Under Different
Terms.-A client Who consents to a lease and sale under terms
different from those set forth in a net listing does not thereby
waive the conditions therein for the payment of a commission,
and thereby become liable under an implied contract to pay
the reasonable value of the services rendered in finding a purchaser.

C. F. HAIGLER et al., Respondents, v. DOTTIE DELPHY
DONNELLY et al., Appellants.

2. See 24 Cal. Jur. 974, 976;.26 R. C. L. 1092.
See 4 Cal. Jur. 615; 8 Am. Jur. 1070.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Brokers, § 46; 2. Trial, §§ 337, 338;
3, 6. Brokers, § 123; 4. Brokers, § 147 (13); 5. Brokers, § 53; 7.
Damages, § 136; 8. Trover and Conversion, § 49; 9. Trover and
, cJonversion, § 27; 10. Brokers, § 44; 11. Brokers, § 40; 12. Trover
and Conversion, § 3; 13. Brokers, § 47.

a
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broker to a designated party, is not an agreement to pay
a commission, but simply all authorization to retain commissions due.

[L. A. No. 17916. In Bank.-Oct. 1, 1941.]

[1] Brokers-Duties and ;Liabilities-Actions-Findings-Implied
Findings.-A finding that a broker, while acting as agent,
received a sum of money belonging to the principal for which
he failed to account, includes by implication a finding that
the transaction was consummated under the original listing
of the property and that the broker was not therefore entitled
to the reasonable value of his services.
[2] Trial-Findings-Implied Findings-Negative Findings.-A
trial court need not make an express finding upon an issue
if it is implicit in the findings made. Nor is there any necessity expressly to negate contradictory allegations.
[3] :arokers-Compensation-Rate and Amount-Commission& in
Excess of Fixed Price.-If a broker's contract for the salld or
lease of. property ~esa net amount to be paid the owner,
the broker's compensation is limited to the excess of the Pll.Yment by the purchaser over the net specified. If he fails to
sell or lease for more than the amount named, he is entitl~d
to no compensation.
[4] Id.-Compensation-Evidence-Modification of Sale Contract
-Sale Under Original Listing.-An implied finding that a
sale and lease were negotiated by a. broker under the original
listing providing for a net amount to be paid the client was
supported by testimony that during the negotiations nothing
was said. concerning a commission, that the client had not
authorized the broker to cancel the original agreement, and
that the original listing card was used by the broker in negotiating the transaction.
. [5] Id.-Compensation - Construction of Contract - Authorization to Retain Money.-A provision whereby a client agrees
that money collected by a broker shall be retained to pay the
, (;ell~r~s cOplm;ission and that the balance shall be paid by the

v. DONNELLY.
o. (2d) 674:]

[7] DamageS-Exemplary Damages-In Contract Actions.-Under
Civ. Code, § 3294, exemplary damages may not be recovered
in an action based upon a contractual obligation, even though
the breach of contract is wilful or malicious. But if the
action is in tort such damages may be recovered upon a proper
Showing of malice, fraud or oppression, even though the tort
incidentally involves a breach of contract. There is a question whether such damages can be recovered in an action for
money had and received.

.
-'

[8] Trover and Conversion - Exemplary Damages. _ Exemplary
damages are properly awardable in an action for conversion
where there is a showing of malice, fraud or oppression.
[9] Id.-Pleading - Complaints Held SUffiCient. _ A complaint
charging the defendant with exercising dominion over property inconsistent with the ownership of plaintiff sets forth a
cause of action for conversion in the absence of a special
demurrer for uncertainty.
[10] Brokers-Duties and LiabilitieS-Pleading_Charge of Conversion.-A complaint alleging that the defendant, while acting as agent for the plaintiff, received a stipulated sum of
money belonging to the plaintiff and refused to account for
it after a proper demand, sufficiently charges conversion in
the absence of a special demurrer for uncertainty .
[11] Id. - Duties and Liabilities - Liability _ Conversion. _ .A
broker or agent is ordinarily liable for convel'ting the funds
of his principal when, he refuses to account for them upon
proper dem~nd.
[12] Trover and Conversion-Property Subject-MoneY.-While
money cannot be the subject of an action for conversion unless a specific Sum capable of identification is' involved, it is
not necessary that each coin or bill be earmarked.

7.

See 8 Cal. Jur. 872; 15 Am. Jur. 708.

't

I,'
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the complaint, plaintiffs accepted the check for $2,258.35
under a stipulation that it could be cashed. without prejudice
to the rights of either party.
The complaint sets forth two causes of action. The first
is for money had and received. The second, after incorporating the allegation of a demand contained in the first
cause of action, alleges that defendant, as agent for plaintiffs,
maliciously and fraudulently refused to account to plaintiffs
for money belonging to plaintiffs which defendant had collected on their account. Then follows a prayer for actual
damages in the SUm of $3408.35 and for exemplary damages
in the Sum of $3,000. The trial court found that defendant
was not entitled to retain as commission the sum withheld
by her and gave judgment for $3408.35 plus $500 as exemplary damages to plaintiffs. From this judgment, defendant has appealed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clement D. Nye, Judge. Affirmed.
Action against broker for money had and received and for
conversion of money collected. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
.Henry S. Cohen and Bernard B. Cohen for Appellants.
W. W. Comstock and H. A. Finkenstein for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs owned a furnished apartment
house ill Los Angeles. In March, 1939, they listed the house
and furniture with defendant, a licensed real estate broker,
the house to be leased at $250 per month, the furniture to be
sold for $3,000 cash, such· amounts to be net to plaintiffs.
A listing card setting forth these terms was signed by plaintiffs and left in the possession of defendant. In April, 1939,
plaintiffs gave to defendant another listing which authorized
the sale of the apartment house and furniture for the lump
sum of $27 ,000 with a five per cent commission to defendant.
Thereafter, through defendant's offices Anna M. Silva agreed
to lease the apartment house for a term of ten years at $250
per month and to buy the furniture for $2500. Defendant
communicated the terms to plaintiffs who accepted them and
executed a written contract with Mrs. Silva on May 11, 1939.
Mrs .. Silva paid $3500 to defendant, $2500 representing the
price of the furniture and $1,000 representing payment on
. account of; the lease. From the total sum defendant reblined, $1,150, which she claimed as commission, and tendered topl~tintiffs a ~heck for $2,258.35, the balance of the
amount paid less prorated rents in the sum of $91.65. Plaintiffs. demanded the full amount of $3408.35 and on being refused undertook the present action. Prior to the filing of

HAIGLER
[18

[13] Brokers -:- Duties and Liabilities - Damages _. Exemplary
Damages - For Conversion. - Where a broker is guilty of
conversion in refusing to account for a sum of money received, and he withheld it, not in good faith under an honest
belief that he was entitled thereto, but as the result of a
fraudulent scheme to secure the client's money by means of
trickery and deliberate falsehood, exemplary damages are
properly awardable pursuant to Civ. Code, § 3294.

.)

Plaintiffs contend that under the original net listing defendant was entitled to receive for her services only such
amounts as she secured in excess of the net prices specified .
Defendant contends that the original net listing was cancelled and the listing card destroyed by her at the instance
of plaintiffs at the time of the second listing. Since the
lease and sale to Mrs. Silva were not within the terms of
the second listing, which contemplated a lump Sum sale of
both building and furniture, defendant bases her alleged
dght to a commission upon the theory of an implied contract
to pay the reasonable value of her services. She also claims
a commission on the basis of an oral contract assertedly
entered into between her and plaintiffs shortly before the deal
with Mrs. Silva was closed.
[1] Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the findings,
citing in particular the failure of the trial Court to find
whether or not she was entitled to the reasonable value of her
services. Following the language of the pleadings, the trial
court found that defendant, while acting as agent for plaintiffs, received the SUm of $3408.35 belonging to them for
which she did not account. This finding of ultimate fact
includes by necessary implication a finding that the transaction was consummated under the original net listing and that
defendant therefore was not entitled to the reasonable value
of her services. [2] There i3 no error in the failure of the
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trial court to, make an express finding upon an issue if it is
implicit in the findings made, and there is no necessity expressly to negate contradictory allegations. (See cases cited
in 24 Cal. Jur. 974, 976.)
, [3]. If,.a broker's contract for the sale or lease of prop-'
e,rty fixes a net amount to be paid the owner, the broker's
compensation is limited to the excess of the payment by the
purchaser over the net amount specified. If he fails to sell
o:rleasefor: more than, the amount named, the broker is entitled to no compensation. (Ford v. Brown, 120 Cal. 551
[52 ,Pac. 817]; S~1l v. Oeschi, 167 Cal. 698 [140 Pac. 949] ;
Ohurch v. Dunham, 14 Ida. 776 [96 Pac. 203] ; Burnett v.
Potts, 236 Ill. 499 [86. N. E. 258] ; Oulbertson'v. Sheridan, 93
Kan. 268 [144 Pac. 268] ; Futrell v. Reeves, 165 Ky. 282 [176
S~ W. 1151] ; G~1more v. Bolio, 165 Mich. 633 [131 N. W. 105,
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1050] ; Beatty v. Russell, 41 Neb. 321 [59
N. W. 919] ; Wolverton v. Tuttle, 51 Ore. 501 [94 Pac. 9611 ;
9 C. J. 581, 582.) [4] Therefore, if there is substantial evidence to support the implied finding of the trial court that
the sale and lease to Mrs. Silva were negotiated under the
original net listing, defendant is not entitled to a commission.
An examination of the record reveals ample evidence to
support the finding. At the trial, plaintiff Haigler testified
that during the negotiations with J\1rs. Silva nothing was said
concerning a commission and that it was his understanding
with defendant that the lease and sale would be governed by
the original net listing. He denied authorizing the cancellation of the .original agreement and the destruction of the
card or making an oral contract to pay defendant a commission. He testified that Mrs. Brown, a saleswoman in the
employ of. defendant, produced the listing card when the deal
was closed but that defendant refused to show it to him.
This testimony was corroborated by Mrs. Silva and her husband, who were present at the time. Mrs. Brown also testified that the listing card was present at the time of the closing,
of the deal with Mrs. Silva and had in fact been used by defendant in negotiating the transaction.
In support of her claim, defendant introduced in evidence
a typewritten receipt admittedly signed by Mr. Haigler which
read: "RECEIVED FROM DONNELLY & COMPANY the
sum of Twenty~five hundred Dollars, above mentioned, Less

v. DONNELLY.
o. (2d) 674]
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10% commission earned." Both Mr. and Mrs. Haigler testified that the words "Less 10%' commission earned" were not
on the receipt at the time Mr. Haigler signed the writing.
Mr. Sellers, a handWriting expert, testified that in his opinion these words were typed at a different time and under
different conditions from the .typewriting preceding them.
Mr. and Mrs. Silva testified that defendant .had said to them
ai different times that "she could do anything with them
[plaintiffs] because they were dumb," and several witnesses
testified that the reputation of defendant for truth and honesty was bad.

~

[5] In further support of an alleged agreement to pay
her a commission, defendant refers to a provision in the contract signed by plaintiffs with Mrs. Silva which reads: "It
is hereby agreed that so much of said down payment, or any
other money collected by Donnelly & Co., as is necessary shall
be retained by Donnelly & Co., to pay the seller's commission
and the balance if any, after said payment, shall be paid by
said Donnelly & Co., to said party of the first part or held by
agent subject to first parties order." This provision is not
an agreement to pay a commission but simply an authoriza_
tion to retain commissions that may be due.
[6] Defendant finally urges that plaintiffs, in consenting
. to a lease and sale under terms different from those set forth
in the net listing, waived the conditions therein for the payment of the commission and thereby became liable under an
implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the services
rendered by defendant in finding a purchaser. This contention is unsound. The parties were not prevented by the
terms of the agreement from negotiating a sale at a reduced
net price. Plaintiff's consent to a $500 reduction of the
price of the furniture did not extinguish the agreement.
Defendant has erroneously sought to invoke a rule applicable
to a broker who undertakes to sell property under an agreement whereby he is to receive as commission a certain percentage of the sale price obtained. In such a case a seller
cannot defeat the right of a broker to his commission by Consummating a sale with the purchaser at a smaller price than
that originally proposed. (Boland v. Ashurst Oil etc. 00.,
145 Cal. 405 [78 Pac. 871J; Wetzell v. Wagoner, 41 Mo. App.
509; cases cited in 9 C. J. 600, 601.) These cases also recognize, however, that the broker is not entitled to any recovery
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if his right to a commission is conditional on a sale at the

price mentioned in his authorization (see cases cited in 9
C. J. 602). A broker under a net contract is entitled to no
compensation unless he successfully negotiates a sale for more
than the net amount. It would be absurd to hold that defendant may recover a commission on concluding a sale for
$2500 when none would be due her had she found a purchaser
for $3,000.
'
[7] The question remains whether the award of exemplary damages is proper. The right to recover punitive or
exemplary damages is created by section 3294 of the Civil
Code which provides that "In an action for the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant
has been guilty. of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or
implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." (See Fitzpatrick v. Clark, 26 Cal.
App. (2d) 710 [80 Pac. (2d) 183].) Under this section exemplary damages may not be recovered in an action based
upon a contractual obligation even though the breach of contract is wilful or malicious. (Berning v. Colodny & Colodny,
103 Cal. App. 188 [284 Pac. 496] ; Baumgarten v. Alliance
Assurance Co., 159 Fed. 275; see 8 Cal. Jur. 872.) If on the
other hand the action is one in tort, exemplary damages may
be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud or oppression even though the tort incidentally involves a breach
of contract. (Gorman v. Southern Pac. Co., 97 Cal. 1 [31 Pac.
1112, 33 Am. St. Rep. 157] ; Lyles v. Perrin, 119 Cal. 264
[51 Pac. 332] ; Jone.') v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 251 [280 Pac. 942] ;
Berning v. Colodny, supra.)
The first cause of action set forth by plaintiff is one for
money had and received. Since it is established in California
that an action for money had and received is ex contractu in
nature, being founded upon a promise implied in law (Philpott v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. (2d) 512 [36 Pac. (2d) 635,
95 A. L. R. 990] ; McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. (2d) 527
[36 Pac. (2d) 642, 95 A. L. R. 1019] ; Los Angeles, Drug Co.
v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. (2d) 71 [63 Pac. (2d) 1124]; see
Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation, 69
Fed. (2d) 131) there is a question whether exemplary damages can be recovered in such an action.

Oct. 1941.J
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[8] The second cause of action set forth by plaintiffs,
however, contains the essential elements of an action for corlversion and is therefore ex delicto in nature. Exemplary
damages are properly awardable in an action for conversion,
given the required showing of malice, fraud or oppression.
(Arzaga v. Villalba, 85 Cal. 191 [24 Pac. 656];, Gilbert v.
Peck, ] 62 Cal. 54 [121 Pac. 315, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1349.].)
[9, 10] This count in brief alleges .that defendant, while
acting as agent for plaintiffs, received a stipulated sumo'f
money belonging to plaintiffs and refused to' account for it
after a proper demand. Defendant contends tJIat ,conyer,sion of the money is not sufnciently:alleged. The more recent cases, however, indicate that a complaint, charging defendant with exercising dominion over property inconsistent
with the ownership of plaintiff sets forth a good cause, of
action for conversion· where no special demurrer for uncertainty is interposed. (Faulkner v. First National Bank, 130
Cal. 258 [62 Pac. 463] ; Dieterle v. Bekin, 143 Cal. 683 [77
Pac. 664J ; Gustafson v. Byers, 105 Cal. App.' 584 [288 Pac.
111] ; First National Bank of Long Beach v. Crown T. & S.
Co., 89 Cal. App. 243 [264 Pac. 534].)
~
[11] A broker or agent is ordinarily liable for converting
the funds of his principal when he refuses to account for
them upon proper demand. (Wood v. Blaney, '107 Cal. 291
[40 Pac. 428J ; Bellus v. Peters, 165 Cal. 112 [130 Pac. 1186] ;
'stacy v. Browne, 99 Okla~ 104 [219 Pac. 336]; Jones v.
Smith, 65 Misc. 528 [120 N. Y. Supp. 865] ; see 3 C. J. S. 19.)
[12] While it is true that money cannot be the subject'of an
action for conversion unless a specific sum capable of identification is involved (Baxter v. King, 81 Cal. App. 192 [253
Pac. 172] ), it is not necessary that each coin or bill be earmarked. When an agent is required to turn over to his principal a dennite sum received by him on his principal's account, the remedy of conversion is proper. (Salem Light &
Traction' Co. v. Anson, 41 Ore. 562 [67 Pac. 1015, 69 Pac.
675] .)

a

[13] The trial court found, in accordance with the al.
1egations set forth in the second cause of action. The evidence is sufficient to show a conversion and to justify the
court in concluding that defendant's refusal to account for
the sum withheld by her was not made in good faith under an
honest belief that she was entitled thereto, but was the re-
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[18 O. (2d) 682]

sult of a fraudulent scheme to secure plaintiffs' money by
:rneans'of trickery and deliberate falsehood. Such action constitutes "oppression, fraud, or malice" within the meaning
of section' 3294 of the Civil Code.
Defendant complains that the judgment is erroneous in
awarding plaintiffs the full amount of $3408.35, whereas in
fact $225~.35, of such sum was paid to plaintiffs before the
trial. Any supposed error in the judgment in this respect is
in no way prejudicial to defendant. She makes no contention
that she will be subjected to double payment, and such a possibility is precluded by the recital on the margin of the judgment acknowledging a partial satisfaction of the judgment
in the sum of $2258.35.
The judgment is affirmed.

PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of the Board
of Governors of The State Bar that petitioner be disbarred.
Petitioner disbarred.
'
Paul Pearlin, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
W. Eugene Craven for Respondent.

Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and
Pullen, J., pro tem., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October
30, 1941.]

[L. A. No. 17914. InBank.-Oct. 1, 1941.]

PAUL PEARLIN, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Attorneys at Law-Disbarment-Misconduct Toward Client

-Commingling of Funds.-An attorney who commingled his
elient's funds with his own and spent them to impress a
prospective client, not as the result of inexperience or inadvertence, but with full cognizance of the impropriety of his
acts, and who had been previously reproved for a similar
act, is properly disbarred.

[2] Id.-Disbar'ment-Defenses-Restitution of MoneY.-An attorney is not entitled to any indulgence by reason of the
restitution of moneys wrongfully retained where such restitution is made aftflr report of his action to The State Bar.
1.

See 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 411; 5 Am. Jur. 423.

MeK. Dig. References: 1. Attorneys at Law, § 140; 2. Attorneys'
at Law, § 15L
'
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THE COURT.-Petitioner was cited to appear before a
local administrative committee of The State Bar and to show
cause why he should not be disciplined for professional misconduct growing out of the alleged violation of his oath and
duties as an attorney and the commission of acts involving
moral turpitude within the meaning of sections 6103 and 6106
of the State Bar Act. At the conclusion of its hearing, the
local committee made findings of fact and recommended disbarment. The Board of Governors adopted the findings and
has recommended to this court that petitioner be disbarred
from the practice of the law. Petitioner does not challenge
the findings or the sufficiency of the evidence to support them.
In his petition he states that this court "in fair justice to
the state and the complainant could not overlook the gravity
of the offense of the petitioner" but he urges that disbarment is "harsh and oppressive" and that" a period of suspension would be sufficient."

[1] At the hearing before the committee petitioner frankly
admitted that he had deliberately commingled the funds of
a client with those of his own and had deliberately, and not
ina,dvertently, expended the same at night clubs and, bars in
an effort, he states, to impress a third person whom he then
regarded as a prospective client. The funds so improperly
commingled and expended represented the proceeds of a
draft in the amount of $130 payable to the client for damages to her automobile and by her endorsed in blank to petitioner to be used by him for the express purpose of purchasing a new automobile for said client. The money was
repaid by petitioner only after the client had reported his
action to The State Bar.
In addition to confessing freely his misconduct, petitioner
also admitted his familiarity at the time with the rules of
professional ethics which prohibit the commingling and misuse
of a client's funds. He stated to the committee that "I don't

